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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Utah Code
§§ 78A-3-102(3)G) and 78A-4-103(2)0').
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT TRACY'S
STATUS AS A BENEFICIARY OF THE TRUST WAS NOT
TERMINATED?

Standard of Review
Since the facts are not disputed, the issue of whether Tracy's Waiver and
Assignment substantially complied with Utah's Disclaimer Statute is a question of
statutory interpretation and therefore constitutes a question of law for which "no
deference need be given the trial court's conclusions." Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc.,
2008 UT App 113, If 4, 182 P.3d 924. With respect to the issue of whether Tracy waived
his beneficial interest in the Trust, "[w]hether a party has effected a waiver is a mixed
question of law and fact." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, \ 21, 140 P.3d 1200. Finally, whether the Trust was modified by
mutual consent of the beneficiaries is likely a mixed question of law and fact.
Preservation for Appeal
This issue was preserved for appeal by being addressed in Phillip's Trial Brief and
in closing arguments at the trial of this matter. [R. 957, 964-969 (Phillip Southwick's
Trial Brief); R. 1092 (Trial Transcript at 400-409)].
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II.

WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF DETREMENTAL RELIANCE
BY PHILLIP WITH RESPECT TO ITS APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE?

Standard of Review
Appellate Courts "will affirm a trial court's ruling against a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge unless it is clearly erroneous." Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56,
122, 181P.3d791.
Preservation for Appeal
The Brief of Appellant does not contain a citation to the record showing that this
issue was preserved in the trial court. See Appellant's Brief at 2-3.
III.

WAS THE TRIAL COURT CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT PHILLIP
DID NOT BREACH HIS DUTY OF LOYALTY TO TRACY IN
ADMINISTERING THE TRUST?

Standard of Review
Since the facts are not disputed, the issue of whether Phillip breached his fiduciary
duty of loyalty to Tracy "is a mixed question of law and fact" for which the trial court is
afforded "ample discretion." Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, ]f 10, 155 P.3d 917.
Preservation for Appeal
The Appellant's Brief does not contain a citation to the record showing that this
issue was preserved in the trial court. See Appellant's Brief at 1-2.
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STATUTES DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL
I.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-802 (2008).

(1) A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.
(2) Subject to the rights of persons dealing with or assisting the trustee as provided in
Section 75-7-1012, a sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or
management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the trustee's own personal
account or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary and
personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary affected by the transaction unless:
(a) the transaction was authorized by the terms of the trust; (b) the transaction was
approved by the court; (c) the beneficiary did not commence a judicial proceeding
within the time allowed by Section 75-7-1005; (d) the beneficiary consented to the
trustee's conduct, ratified the transaction, or released the trustee in compliance with
Section 75-7-1009; or (e) the transaction involves a contract entered into or claim
acquired by the trustee before the person became or contemplated becoming trustee.
(3) A sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or management of
trust property is presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary
interests if it is entered into by the trustee with:
(a) the trustee's spouse; (b) the trustee's descendants, siblings, parents, or their spouses;
(c) an agent of the trustee, including but not limited to an attorney, accountant, or
financial advisor; or (d) a corporation or other person or enterprise in which the trustee,
or a person that owns a significant interest in the trustee, has an interest that might
affect the trustee's best judgment.
(4) A transaction between a trustee and a beneficiary that does not concern trust property
but that occurs during the existence of the trust or while the trustee retains significant
influence over the beneficiary and from which the trustee obtains an advantage is
voidable by the beneficiary unless the trustee establishes that the transaction was fair to
the beneficiary.
(5) A transaction not concerning trust property in which the trustee engages in the
trustee's individual capacity involves a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests if
the transaction concerns an opportunity properly belonging to the trust.
(6) An investment by a trustee in securities of an investment company or investment trust
3

to which the trustee, or its affiliate, provides services in a capacity other than as trustee is
not presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests if the
investment complies with the prudent investor rule of Section 75-7-901. The trustee may
be compensated by the investment company or investment trust for providing those
services out of fees charged to the trust.
(7) In voting shares of stock or in exercising powers of control over similar interests in
other forms of enterprise, the trustee shall act in the best interests of Ihe beneficiaries. If
the trust is the sole owner of a corporation or other form of enterprise, the trustee shall
elect or appoint directors or other managers who will manage the corporation or
enterprise in the best interests of the beneficiaries.
(8) This section does not preclude the following actions by the trustee:
(a) an agreement between the trustee and a beneficiary relating to the appointment or
compensation of the trustee; (b) payment of reasonable compensation to the trustee; (c)
a transaction between a trust and another trust, decedent's estate, conservatorship, or
guardianship of which the trustee is a fiduciary or in which a beneficiary has an interest;
(d) a deposit of trust money in a regulated financial service institution operated by the
trustee; (e) an advance by the trustee of money for the protection of the trust; (f)
collecting, holding, and retaining trust assets received from a trustor until, in the
judgment of the trustee, disposition of the assets should be made, even though the assets
include an asset in which the trustee is personally interested; (g) acquiring an undivided
interest in a trust asset in which the trustee, in any trust capacity, holds an undivided
interest; (h) borrowing money to be repaid from the trust assets or otherwise; (i)
advancing money to be repaid from the assets or otherwise; (j) employing persons,
including attorneys, auditors, investment advisers, or agents, even if they are associated
with the trustee: (i) to advise or assist the trustee in the performance of the trustee's
administrative duties or perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary;
or (ii) to act without independent investigation upon their recommendations; (k) if a
governing instrument or order requires or authorizes investment in United States
government obligations, investing in those obligations, either directly or in the form of
securities or other interests, in any open-end or closed-end management type
investment company or investment trust registered under the provisions of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15U.S.C. Sections 80a-1 through 80a-64 if: (i) the
portfolio of the investment company or investment trust is limited to United States
government obligations, and repurchase agreements are fully collateralized by United
States government obligations; and (ii) the investment company or investment trust
4

takes delivery of the collateral for any repurchase agreement either directly or through
an authorized custodian.
(9) The court may appoint a special fiduciary to make a decision with respect to any
proposed transaction that might violate this section if entered into by the trustee.
IL

UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802 (1991).

See addendum of Appellant's Brief.
III.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-411 (2004).

(1) A noncharitable, irrevocable trust may be modified or terminated upon consent of the
settlor and all beneficiaries, even if the modification or termination is inconsistent with a
material purpose of the trust. A settlor's power to consent to a trust's termination may be
exercised by an agent under a power of attorney only to the extent expressly authorized
by the power of attorney or the terms of the trust, by the settlor's conservator with the
approval of the court supervising the conservatorship if an agent is not so authorized, or
by the settlor's guardian with the approval of the court supervising the guardianship if an
agent is not so authorized and a conservator has not been appointed.
(2) A noncharitable, irrevocable trust may be terminated upon consent of all of the
beneficiaries if the court concludes that continuance of the trust is not necessary to
achieve any material purpose of the trust. A noncharitable, irrevocable trust may be
modified upon consent of all of the beneficiaries if the court concludes that modification
is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.
(3) A spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust is not presumed to constitute a
material purpose of the trust.
(4) Upon termination of a trust under Subsection (1) or (2), the trustee shall distribute the
trust property as agreed by the beneficiaries.
(5) If not all of the beneficiaries consent to a proposed modification or termination of the
trust under Subsection (1) or (2), the modification or termination may be approved by the
court if the court is satisfied that:
(a) if all of the beneficiaries had consented, the trust could have been modified or
terminated under this section; and
(b) the interests of a beneficiary who does not consent will be adequately protected.
5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
The first question presented by this case is whether Tracy's status as a beneficiary

of the Trust was terminated by virtue of his execution of the Waiver and Assignment
and/or the letters Tracy sent to Phillip and Robert S. Milner ("Robert"). Tracy's Wavier
and Assignment substantially complied with Utah's Disclaimer Statute, and even if it did
not, Tracy's Waiver and Assignment and/or his letters served as a waiver of Tracy's
beneficial interest in the Trust. Furthermore, the sole settlor of the Trust and all of the
beneficiaries of the Trust mutually agreed to modify the Trust such that Tracy no longer
retained his status as a beneficiary.
If the Court finds that Tracy's status as a beneficiary of the Trust was not
terminated, the Court must evaluate the trial court's conclusions—giving due
consideration to the unique facts of this case— that Tracy should be estopped from
claiming a beneficial interest in the Trust prior to the filing of the Complaint in this
matter. In any case, Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy, and even
if he did, Tracy is estopped from making such an assertion.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS/DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.
Tracy filed a Complaint on January 4, 2006. [R. 1-26 (Complaint)]. Pursuant to a

motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that the Decree of Divorce issued by
Judge Gunnell on November 4, 1991 did not operate to terminate Tracy's beneficial
interest in the Trust despite the statements made therein to the contrary since the court
6

that issued the decree did not have authority to affect the interests of the beneficiaries not
a party to the divorce. [R. 517-23 (Memorandum Decision)].
A two-day bench trial was conducted before the Honorable Judge Ben H. Hadfield
on June 16-17, 2009. [R. 1004-09 (Bench Trial Minutes)]. Following the bench trial,
Judge Hadfield concluded that Tracy's Waiver and Assignment did not substantially
comply with Utah's Disclaimer Statute, that under the circumstances Phillip did not
breach any fiduciary duties to Tracy, and that Tracy was equitably estopped from
claiming a beneficial interest in the Trust prior to the filing of his Complaint. [R. 1092
(Trial Transcript at 415-419); R. 1066-76 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)].
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 13, 1989, a Trust Agreement drafted by attorney Dale M. Dorius
was executed by Don Southwick ("Don") and Barbara Southwick ("Barbara"), as
husband and wife, for the purpose of creating a Trust. [R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact
ffl[ 1,2); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A" 1 ]. The Trust Agreement
provided that Phillip, Robert, and Tracy were beneficiaries of the Trust. [R. 1066, 1067
(Findings of Fact If 3); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"]. Robert is

The trial court did not include the trial exhibits when it transmitted the record to Phillip.
In fact, it was only today that the trial court notified Phillip that it had located the trial
exhibits. Since this brief is due today, and it is not feasible to retrieve the trial exhibits
prior to the deadline for filing this brief, Phillip's copies of the relevant exhibits offered
into evidence at trial will be included in the Addendum attached hereto. The trial court's
copies of the trial exhibits will then be provided in an addendum to Phillip's reply brief
on the issues Phillip has raised on appeal.
7

Barbara's son from a previous marriage, Tracy is Don's son from a previous marriage,
and Phillip is the son of both Don and Barbara. [R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact ^ 4)].
The Trust Agreement provided for Phillip to serve as the Trustee of the Trust. [R.
1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact 1j 5); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"]. As
Trustee, Phillip was to disburse to Don and Barbara "such amounts from the principal or
income of the Trust Estate as they shall from time to time direct" during their lifetimes.
[R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact 16); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"].
However, Don and Barbara's marriage was dissolved by a Decree of Divorce
issued by Judge Gunnell on November 4, 1991. [R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact ^ 7); R.
1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); Addendum Exhibit "B"]. This Decree of Divorce mandated that
Barbara was to be the sole beneficiary of the Trust and directed "the Trustee, Phillip D.
Southwick, to do whatever is necessary to . . . make Barbara P. Southwick the sole
beneficiary of the assets in the trust as her sole and separate property." [R. 1066, 1067
(Findings of Fact | 8); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); Addendum Exhibit "B"].
Phillip was aware of the divorce proceedings while they were pending and was
aware of the result of the divorce at the time it was issued and relied upon the Decree of
Divorce in performing his duties as Trustee of the Trust going forward. [R. 1066, 1068
(Findings of Fact ]( 9)]. Specifically, Phillip reasonably understood that his mother,
Barbara, was to be the sole owner and/or beneficiary of all of the Trust assets and as such
could control them. [R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact 1j 9)].

8

Consistent with the Decree of Divorce, Don and Barbara signed a document
referred to herein as the Joint Release that directed Phillip "to convey and transfer all of
the assets located in [the Trust] to Barbara P. Southwick as the sole beneficiary under the
terms of said Trust Agreement." [R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Factffif10,11); R. 1008
(Def. Exhibit 5); Addendum Exhibit "C"]. Barbara delivered, and Phillip approved and
accepted into the Trust, the signed Joint Release on or about December 12, 1991. [R.
1066, 1068 (Findings of Factffif12,13); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 5); Addendum Exhibit
"C"].
Tracy knew about the existence of the Trust and his beneficial interest therein
within a few weeks after Don and Barbara's divorce at the latest. [R. 1066, 1068
(Findings of Fact ]f 14)]. On January 31, 1992, Tracy signed a document which had been
prepared by attorney Dale M. Dorius as per Barbara's instructions and which is referred
to herein as the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact ]f 15); R. 1008
(Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"]. At this time, Tracy was aware of the outcome
of the divorce, namely the property distribution and Barbara's status as the sole
beneficiary of the Trust, and that all trust assets were to be transferred to her. [R. 1066,
1068 (Findings of Fact 115)].
In signing the Waiver and Assignment, Tracy purported to renounce "any claim he
may have in any of the Trust Estate including income and/or principal, all cash including
bank accounts, and all proceeds from life insurance policies and further[] said Trustee to
distribute his share of the Trust Estate to PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK." [R. 1066, 1069
9

(Findings of Fact 116); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"]. Barbara
delivered the Waiver and Assignment to Phillip, who as Trustee approved and accepted
the Waiver and Assignment into the Trust on March 12, 1992. [R. 1066, 1069 (Findings
of Fact H 17); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"].
At that time, Phillip knew that attorney Dale Dorius had prepared the Trust and
other Trust documents, had advised Don and Barbara off and on regarding the Trust, and
had prepared the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact ^| 17)].
Phillip believed that the Decree of Divorce was a valid directive requiring that Barbara
become the sole Trustor and sole Beneficiary of the Trust, and that as a result she was
free to modify and/or terminate the Trust and/or control the property at her discretion.
[R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact If 24)].
Barbara told Phillip that she planned and intended to carry on with the Trust, since
Don and Tracy were no longer beneficiaries, in order to avoid potential federal tax
consequences associated with having all of the Trust property transferred to her
individually and to avoid the inconvenience and cost of setting up a new trust. [R. 1066,
1070 (Findings of Fact ^ 25)]. She also told Phillip that it was her intent and desire that
Robert and Phillip receive the trust property upon her death and that accordingly they
remain as beneficiaries of the Trust and that the property would be evenly split between
Phillip and Robert upon her death. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact If 26)].
For these reasons, Phillip reasonably believed it unnecessary to transfer all of the
Trust property from a trust which purportedly no longer named Don or Tracy as
10

beneficiaries into a second trust of the same status. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact ^
27)]. As a result of Barbara's expression of her plans and intent, Phillip and Robert did
not ever purport to renounce their interests in the Trust, nor were they asked to renounce
their interest in the Trust. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact 1j 28)].
Barbara died in February of 2002. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact 129)]. In a
letter addressed to and received by Phillip dated April 7, 2002, which was drafted over
ten years after Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment, Tracy wrote that he did not
remember whether or not he signed the Waiver and Assignment, that he was not going to
do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted
with the Trust assets. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact 130); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 7);
Addendum Exhibit "E"]. In a letter addressed to and received by Robert dated April 20,
2002, Tracy again wrote that he did not remember whether or not he signed the Waiver
and Assignment, that he was not going to do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip
and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the Trust assets. [R. 1066, 1071
(Findings of Fact If 31); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 8); Addendum Exhibit "F"].
Just prior to writing these letters, Tracy and Phillip had argued over Tracy's
claimed interest in the Trust and/or assets of Barbara, with Tracy claiming he still had an
interest, and Phillip arguing otherwise. [R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact f 32)]. After
Barbara's death and the receipt of Tracy's letter dated April 7, 2002, Phillip liquidated or
sold some real property and distributed those proceeds and a few other Trust assets
equally between himself and Robert under the reasonable belief that he and Robert were
11

the only beneficiaries of the Trust in reasonable reliance upon the Waiver and
Assignment as well as Tracy's letters stating that Phillip and Robert could do whatever
they wanted with the estate and that Tracy wasn't going to anything about it. [R. 1066,
1071 (Findings of Fact If 33)].
Tracy made a statement that he was renouncing his beneficial interest in the Trust
by signing the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact 1j 19); R. 1008
(Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"]. Phillip would not have made the Trust
property distributions he made, or would have taken other measures, had Tracy not
signed the Waiver and Assignment and not written the letters containing statements that
Tracy did not remember whether or not he signed the Waiver and Assignment, was not
going to do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they
wanted with the Trust assets. [R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact 134)].
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT TRACY'S
STATUS AS A BENEFICIARY OF THE TRUST WAS NOT
TERMINATED.
The trial court found that the Waiver and Assignment executed by Tracy did not

substantially comply with the version of Utah's Disclaimer Statute in effect when Tracy
signed the Waiver and Assignment. However, Tracy's Waiver and Assignment strictly
complied with the first three prongs of the applicable disclaimer statute. Furthermore, the
fourth prong of the disclaimer statute was directory and no one, including Tracy, suffered
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prejudice by the failure of the Waiver and Assignment to strictly comply with the fourth
prong.
Tracy's Wavier and Assignment and/or the letters he drafted to Phillip and Robert
also served as an effective waiver of Tracy's beneficial interest in the Trust.
Furthermore, the undisputed evidence presented at trial also established that the sole
settlor of the Trust and all of the beneficiaries of the Trust—including Tracy—mutually
agreed to modify the Trust for the purpose of terminating Tracy's status as a beneficiary
of the Trust.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION OF DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE
BY PHILLIP WITH RESPECT TO ITS APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL IS SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
In examining Tracy's argument that Tracy should not be equitably estopped from

asserting a beneficial interest in the Trust prior to the filing of Tracy's Complaint, it is
clear that Tracy's argument is really an attack on the trial court's findings of fact.
Evidence was presented to the trial court that Phillip would suffer a detriment if Tracy
were permitted by the trial court to assert that he did not renounce his beneficial interest
in the Trust prior to the filing of the Complaint.
As a result, Tracy has failed to fulfill his duty to marshal the evidence.
Furthermore, the evidence presented to the trial court establishes that the trial court's
findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that it did not exceed the bounds of its
significant discretion with respect to its legal conclusion that Phillip would suffer a
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detriment if Tracy were permitted by the trial court to assert that he did not renounce his
beneficial interest in the Trust prior to the filing of the Complaint.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PHILLIP DID
NOT BREACH A FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LOYALTY TO TRACY.
In examining Tracy's argument that Phillip breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty

to Tracy, it is clear that Tracy's argument is really an attack on the trial court's findings
of fact. However, Tracy failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings of fact and consequently is barred from challenging the conclusion of law based
thereon that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy.
In addition, a review of all of the facts and circumstances—as opposed to a few
out-of-context facts—surrounding the trial court's conclusion that Phillip did not breach a
fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy confirms that the trial court did not abuse its ample
discretion. Furthermore, Tracy has failed to challenge the trial court" s holding that Tracy
is equitably estopped from asserting that Phillip breached his fiduciary duties prior to the
filing of the Complaint in this matter.
IV.

AFFIRMATION ON OTHER GROUNDS.
Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty to Tracy by administering the Trust as

though Tracy were not a beneficiary since Phillip could not justifiably disregard the
Decree of Divorce. Furthermore, Tracy should not be entitled to assert that he was a
beneficiary of the Trust prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter siace the Decree
of Divorce was valid until it was set aside by the trial court after the filing of the
Complaint.
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ARGUMENTS
Phillip will first address the issue forming the basis of Phillip's cross-appeal:
whether the trial court erred in not concluding that Tracy's status as a beneficiary of the
Trust was terminated. If the trail court did err, then an analysis of Tracy's appeal is
unnecessary. Tracy's argument that the trial court's conclusion of detrimental reliance by
Phillip was not supported by evidence will then be addressed, followed by an analysis of
Tracy's claim that Phillip breached a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy by making
distributions from the Trust to Phillip and Robert. In conclusion, an alternative ground to
uphold the trial court's judgment will be set forth.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT TRACY'S
STATUS AS A BENEFICIARY OF THE TRUST WAS NOT
TERMINATED.
Tracy's beneficial interest in the Trust was terminated by either (a) substantial

compliance with Utah's Disclaimer Statute; (b) waiver; or (c) mutual modification of the
Trust.
A.

Substantial Compliance with Utah's Disclaimer Statute.
Tracy's Waiver and Assignment substantially complied with the Disclaimer

Statute in effect when Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit
6); Addendum Exhibit "D"].
According to the Utah Supreme Court:
[Substantial compliance with a statutory provision is adequate when the provision
is directory, meaning it goes merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of
the business, and the policy behind the statute has still been realized. Additionally,
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a reviewing court should apply the substantial compliance standard only when no
prejudice occurs as a result of failure to follow the direction of the statute.
Aaron and Morey Bonds and Bail v. Third Dist. Court, 2007 UT 24,17,156 P.3d
801 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The trial court found that Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1092
(Trial Transcript at 416); R. 1066, 1068-69 (Findings of Factfflf15-16, 20)]. When Tracy
signed the Waiver and Assignment, Utah's Disclaimer Statute provided that a
"beneficiary under a nontestamentary instrument. .. may disclaim in whole or in part the
right of transfer to the person of any property or interest in it by delivering or filing a
written disclaimer under this section." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(l)(a) (1991). In
this case, the Waiver and Assignment was delivered to Phillip in his capacity as trustee of
the Trust. [R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact \ 17)].
The Disclaimer Statute further provided that "[t]he disclaimer shall: (i) describe
the property or interest in it disclaimed; (ii) declare the disclaimer and extent of it; (iii) be
signed by the disclaimant; and (iv) state that the disclaimer is proper under Subsection
(4), and was made within the required time limits." Id, § 75-2-802(1 )(b). An inspection
of Tracy's Waiver and Assignment reveals that it strictly complies with the first three
disclaimer prongs since it is signed by Tracy and adequately describes the property
disclaimed and the extent of the disclaimer. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum
Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact ^ 16)].
Although Tracy's Waiver and Assignment does not specifically state that it is
proper under Subsection (4) or made within the required time limits, it was in fact proper
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under Subsection (4) and was made within the required time limits. [R. 1008 (Def.
Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact H 16)]. Subsection
(4) sets forth four situations that preclude the right to disclaim trust property:
The right to disclaim property or an interest in it is barred by: (i) an assignment,
conveyance, encumbrance, pledge, or transfer of the property or interest, or a
contract therefor; (ii) a written waiver of the right to disclaim; (iii) an acceptance
of the property or interest or benefit thereunder; or (iv) a sale of the property or
interest under judicial sale made before the disclaimer is effected.
Id. § 75-2-802(4)(a).
In this case, there is no evidence that Tracy assigned, conveyed, encumbered,
pledged, or transfered the Trust property or his interest in the Trust (or entered into a
contract therefor) prior to his execution of the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1091 (Trial
Transcript at 52-126,140-167)]. Similarly, there is no evidence that Tracy ever waived in
writing the right to disclaim his interest in the Trust. [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 52126,140-167)]. Furthermore, Tracy had not accepted the property interest or benefit
contemplated by the Trust when he signed the Waiver and Assignment and there is no
evidence that the Trust property or Tracy's interest in the Trust had been sold pursuant to
a judicial sale prior to the acceptance of the Waiver and Assignment by the Trust. [R.
1091 (Trial Transcript at 52-126,140-167)].
With respect to whether the Waiver and Assignment was made within the required
time limit, "the [disclaimer] shall be delivered or filed not later than nine months after the
person has actual knowledge of the existence of the interest." Id. § 75-2-802(2)(a).
Tracy first learned of the existence of the Trust and his interest therein within a few
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weeks after the divorce of Don and Barbara on November 4,1991. [R. 1066, 1068
(Findings of Fact f 14)]. Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment ou January 31, 1992.
[R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact If 15)]. The Waiver and Assignment was delivered to
and accepted by Phillip, the trustee, by March 12, 1992. [R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact
117)]. Accordingly, Tracy's Waiver and Assignment was made within the required time
limit.
Based on these undisputed facts, Tracy's Waiver and Assignment substantially
complies with the Disclaimer Statute. First, Tracy did not present any evidence that he or
anyone else was prejudiced by the failure of the Waiver and Assignment to explicitly
state that the disclaimer was proper under Subsection (4) and was made within the
required time limits. [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 52-126,140-167)]. Furthermore, the
Disclaimer Statute's provision that a disclaimer must explicitly state that it is proper
under Subsection (4) and timely made is directory since it goes to the proper and orderly
execution of a disclaimer.
The failure of a disclaimer to recite that it was proper under Subsection (4) and
made within the required time limits does not thwart the policy behind the Disclaimer
Statute, which is to provide an avenue for a beneficiary to disclaim his or her beneficial
interest in a trust, in cases such as this where the disclaimer was in fact proper and timely
made. In contrast, the first three prongs of the Disclaimer Statute constitute the essence
of a disclaimer and are not merely directory. Consequently, strict compliance is required
of the first three prongs since their exclusion from a disclaimer would thwart the purpose
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and policy behind the Disclaimer Statue. Indeed, the legislature subsequently dispensed
with the requirement that a disclaimer include an explicit statement that it was proper
under Subsection (4) and timely made even though disclaimers must still be proper and
timely. &e UTAH CODE A m § 75-2-801 (1998).
Tracy's Waiver and Assignment substantially complied with the Disclaimer
Statute in effect when Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment. Accordingly, Tracy's
status as a beneficiary of the Trust ceased when Phillip accepted the Waiver and
Assignment into the Trust. To hold otherwise would exalt form over substance. As a
result, the trial court erred in concluding that Tracy's Waiver and Assignment did not
substantially comply with the Disclaimer Statute.
B.

Waiver.
Tracy effectively waived his beneficial interest in the Trust by executing the

Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"]. The
Disclaimer Statute explicitly provides, "[t]his section does not abridge the right of
persons to waive, release, assign, convey, disclaim, or renounce property or an interest in
it under any other statute." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(5) (1991). In other words,
compliance with the Disclaimer Statute was not the only method by which Tracy was
entitled to effectively relinquish his beneficial interest in the Trust. Indeed, the equitable
doctrine of waiver, which has been incorporated into Utah's Uniform Trust Code by
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statute, is one method by which a beneficiary can relinquish a beneficial interest in a
trust notwithstanding a spendthrift provision.
"Waiver requires three elements: (1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2)
knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right." Soter's, Inc. v.
Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). Applied to the case
at bar, Tracy was a beneficiary of the Trust pursuant to the executeon of the Trust
Agreement. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings
of Fact <([ 3)]. Tracy knew of his status as a beneficiary of the Trust. [R. 1066, 1068
(Findings of Fact U 14)]. Tracy intended to completely relinquish his beneficial interest
in the Trust by signing the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6);
Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact If 16)]. As a result, Tracy
ceased at that point to be a beneficiary of the Trust under the equitable doctrine of
waiver.
Even if the Court finds that Tracy's Waiver and Assignment was not an effective
waiver, Tracy's letters to Phillip and Robert in April of 2002 effectively waived his
beneficial interest in the Trust as well as the claim that Tracy is now asserting that Phillip
breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit Tflf 7-8); Addendum
Exhibits "E", "F"]. Tracy argued to Phillip that he was a beneficiar> of the Trust prior to
sending letters to Phillip and Robert in April of 2002. [R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact %
2

"The common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement this chapter, except to
the extent modified by this chapter or laws of this state." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-106
(Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
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32)]. Tracy also knew at that time about the principal Trust asset—the real property in
Lehi, Utah. [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 71 If 23 - 73 1f 15)].
In a letter addressed to and received by Phillip dated April 7, 2002, Tracy wrote
that he was not going to do anything about the Trust and that Phillip and Robert could do
whatever they wanted with the Trust assets. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit ]f 7); Addendum
Exhibit "E"; R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact ^ 30)]. In a letter addressed to and received
by Robert dated April 20, 2002, Tracy again wrote that he was not going to do anything
about the Trust and that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the Trust
assets. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit Tf 8); Addendum Exhibit "F"; R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of
Fact If 31)].
Tracy's letters clearly manifest an intention to relinquish any interest that he had
in the Trust at that time and any claims he had or would have against Phillip for not
recognizing his beneficial interest in the Trust. As a result, Tracy waived both his
beneficial interest in the Trust and the claims he is now asserting against Phillip for
breaching his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy.
C.

Mutual Modification of the Trust.
The evidence presented to the trail court establishes that Don, Barbara, Phillip,

Robert, and Tracy all mutually agreed to effect a modification of the Trust by terminating
Tracy's beneficial interest in the Trust. As noted by the Utah Supreme Court, "all
beneficiaries can terminate a trust even though its continuance is necessary to carry out a
material purpose of the trust when the settlor(s) consent to its termination." Sundquist v.
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Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 187 n.2 (Utah 1981). It is axiomatic that the power of
termination also carries with it the power of modification: "[a] noncharitable, irrevocable
trust may be modified or terminated upon consent of the settler and all beneficiaries,
even if the modification or termination is inconsistent with a material purpose of the
trust." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-411 (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
In this case, the beneficiaries (Phillip, Robert and Tracy) and settlors (Don and
Barbara) all agreed to modify the Trust at least to the extent of making Barbara the sole
beneficiary of the Trust, which in turn would allow Barbara to do whatever she desired
with the Trust. Don and Barbara affirmatively consented to the trust modification by
signing the Joint Release. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit | 5); Addendum EKhibit "C"; R. 1066,
1068 (Findings of Factfflf10,11)]. Tracy affirmatively consented to the trust
modification by signing the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit ]f 6);
Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact If 16)]. Phillip affirmatively
consented to trust modification by accepting the Joint Release and the Waiver and
Assignment into the Trust. [R. 1066, 1068-69 (Findings of Fact ffl| 12,13, 17)]. Robert
testified that he affirmatively consented to the trust modification. [R. 1092 (Trial
Transcript at 273-274)].
Since everyone associated with the Trust consented to Barbara as the sole
beneficiary and owner of the Trust, the Trust was modified by mutual consent and Tracy
ceased thereafter to be a beneficiary of the Trust.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION OF DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE
BY PHILLIP WITH RESPECT TO ITS APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL IS SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
The trial court held that "Tracy is equitably estopped from asserting that, prior to

the filing of the Complaint in the above-entitled matter, he did not renounce his beneficial
interest in the Trust." [R. 1066, 1074 (Conclusions of Law K 14)].
To prevail on an equitable estoppel claim, a defendant must prove that (1) a party
made "a statement, admission, act, or failure to act. . . inconsistent with a claim
later asserted;" (2) defendant changed his position or took action in reliance on
that "statement, admission, act, or failure to act;" and (3) the defendant's reliance
would operate to his detriment if the court allowed the other "party to contradict or
repudiate" its earlier "statement, admission, act, or failure to act."
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 34, 70 P.3d 111 (quoting CECO Corp. v. Concrete
Specialists, Inc., 72 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989)).
On appeal, Tracy's only challenge to the trial court's application of equitable
estoppel is his assertion that the trial court was not presented with any evidence of
detrimental reliance by Phillip. See Appellants Brief at 13-14. This assertion is incorrect
and reflects Tracy's failure to fulfill his obligation to marshal the evidence.
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party
challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." See also State v. Clark 2005 UT 75,117, 124 P.3d 235;
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, Tj 21, 54 P.3d 1177. To
pass this threshold, parties protesting findings of fact must "marshal all the
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most
favorable to the court below." Clark, 2005 UT 75, \ 17, 124 P.3d 235 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, \ 24,
140 P.3d 1200.
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An appellant "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists." Id. at ^ 77 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, an appellant
may not simply review the evidence presented at trial, nor may she "re-argue the
factual case [she] presented in the trial court." Id. If an appellant argues that no
evidence supports a factual finding, the burden to marshal does not then shift
to the appellee; rather, the appellee may prove that the appellant did not meet
her marshaling burden by presenting a "scintilla" of evidence supporting the
district court's finding. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ]f
22, 54P.3dll77.
Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, ^ 25, 112 P.3d 495 (emphasis added). Every "scrap" of
evidence includes all inferences from the evidence. See State v. Valdez, 203 UT App
100,f 20 n.l 1,68 P.3d 1052.
This does not mean that the party may simply provide an exhaustive review of all
evidence presented at trial. Id. at \ 12 n. 1. Rather, appellants must provide a
precisely focused summary of all the evidence supporting the findings they
challenge. Id. This summary must correlate all particular items of evidence with
the challenged findings and then convince us that the trial court erred in the
assessment of that evidence to its findings. W. Valley City v. Majestic Inv., Co.,
818P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991).
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f77, 100 P.3d 1177.
Once the evidence is marshaled, only then is an appellate court in a position to
fairly evaluate whether the trial court's findings of fact were adequately supported by
evidence.
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In
order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, an appellant
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence. If the evidence is inadequately
marshaled, [the Utah Supreme Court] assumes that all findings are adequately
supported by the evidence.
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Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 19, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal quotation marks, alterations,
and citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting
Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, \ 27, 140 P.3d 1200 ("We repeatedly have
warned of the grim consequences parties face when they fail to fulfill the marshaling
requirement").
Incidentally, Tracy is still required to marshal the evidence even if he is only
challenging the trial court's legal conclusions related to its application of equitable
estoppel. It is well established that "estoppel is a 'mixed question of law and fact of an
extremely fact-sensitive nature to which we grant significant deference.'" Save
Beaver County v. Beaver County, 2009 UT 8, If 9, 203 P.3d 937 (quoting Glew v. Ohio
Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, If 19, 181 P.3d 791) (emphasis added).
If the application of the standard is extremely fact sensitive, then the reviewing
court should generally give the trial court considerable discretion in determining
whether the facts of a particular case come within the established rule of law.
Even where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a
determination of the correctness of a courts9 application of a legal standard is
extremely fact-sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to marshal the
evidence.
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 20, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
The foregoing case law clearly establishes that Tracy is under an obligation to
marshal the evidence regardless of whether he frames the issue as a challenge to the trial
court's findings of fact or the trial court's legal conclusions. Importantly, an appellant
cannot delay its obligation to marshal the evidence until he files his reply brief. Indeed,
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"this eleventh-hour attempt to marshal the evidence and challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence in the reply brief is too late":
An appellant seeking to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
finding of fact must undertake and meet its heavy marshalling burden in its
opening memorandum of law on appeal. An appellant cannot hold its sufficiency
of the evidence challenge in reserve and wait to marshal the evidence in its reply
brief Allowing such a procedure would deprive the appellee of any opportunity to
respond and defend the sufficiency of the evidence and the findings of fact.
Atlas Steel Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com fn, 2002 UT 112, U 40-41, 61 P.3d 1053.
In this case, a comparison of Tracy's brief with a "scintilla" of evidence from the
record reveals that Tracy failed to meet his burden to marshal the evidence. See
Appellant's Brief at 14 ("there is no record evidence to support a finding of detrimental
reliance by Phillip"). With respect to the first element of equitable estoppel, Tracy has
not argued that the trial court's findings of fact were not supported by evidence or clearly
erroneous with respect to its findings that Tracy made statements that he was renouncing
his beneficial interest in the Trust and that he would not make a claim against the Trust.
See Appellant's Brief at 13-14. These statements were obviously inconsistent with his
later-asserted claims in this matter. [R. 1-26 (Complaint); R. 1092 (Trial Transcript at
370-390)].
Furthermore, Tracy has not argued that the trial court exceeded its significant
discretion in concluding that these statements satisfied the first element of equitable
estoppel. See Appellant's Brief at 13-14. Accordingly, evidence of Tracy's statements
satisfying the first prong of equitable estoppel shall be set forth with references to the
trial court's oral ruling at the conclusion of the bench trial and its findings of fact since "it
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is presumed the findings of fact of the trial court are supported by evidence." See Clark
v. Jennings, 98 P.2d 348, 348 (Utah 1940).
On January 31, 1992, Tracy signed a statement (the Waiver and Assignment)
renouncing "any claim he may have in any of the Trust Estate including income and/or
principal, all cash including bank accounts, and all proceeds from life insurance policies."
[R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit H 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1068-69 (Findings of Fact
fflf 15-16)]. Thereafter, Tracy drafted a letter dated April 7, 2002 that was addressed to
and received by Phillip wherein Tracy stated that he did not remember whether or not he
signed the Waiver and Assignment, but that he was not going to do anything about the
Trust, and that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the Trust assets.
[R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit \ 7); Addendum Exhibit "E"; R. 1066, 1070-71 (Findings of Fact
130)].
Tracy also drafted a letter dated April 20, 2002 that was addressed to and received
by Robert wherein Tracy again stated that he did not remember whether or not he signed
the Waiver and Assignment, that he was not going to do anything about the Trust, and
that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the Trust assets. [R. 1008
(Def. Exhibit \ 8); Addendum Exhibit "F"; R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact \ 31)].
According to the trial court, "Tracy's letters to Phillip and Robert in April 2002, at least
six separate times in those two letters, say that Tracy will not assert a claim. They say it
in several ways, but they say it at least six times in the two letters." [R. 1092 (Trial
Transcript at 417)].
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With respect to the second element of equitable estoppel, Tracy has not argued
that the trial court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous with respect to its finding that
Phillip reasonably changed his position or took action in reliance on Tracy's statements
that he was renouncing his beneficial interest in the Trust and was not going to assert a
claim against the Trust. See Appellant's Brief at 13-14. Similarly, Tracy has not argued
that the trial court exceeded its significant discretion in concluding that the second
element of equitable estoppel was established by Phillip's reliance on Tracy's statements.
See Appellant's Brief at 13-14.
Accordingly, evidence of Phillip's reliance on Tracy's statements shall be set forth
with reference to the trial court's oral ruling and its findings of fact since "it is presumed
the findings of fact of the trial court are supported by evidence." See Clark v. Jennings,
98 P.2d 348, 348 (Utah 1940).
After . . . the receipt of Tracy's letter dated April 7, 2002, Phillip liquidated or sold
some real property and distributed those proceeds and a few other Trust assets
equally between himself and Robert under the reasonable belief that he and Robert
were the only beneficiaries of the Trust in reasonable reliance upon the Waiver
and Assignment as well as Tracy's letters stating that Phillip and Robert could do
whatever they wanted with the estate and that Tracy wasn't going to anything
about it.
R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact 1j 33). In other words,
When the defendant trustee, Phillip, sold the property and distributed [the
proceeds] in March of 2005, it seems to the Court that he reasonably relied on
[Tracy's Waiver and Assignment] and on Tracy's multiple written assertions that
he would make no claim against the trust or against his brothers. And, therefore,
the Court finds that the plaintiff is estopped from claiming an interest in any
disbursements prior to the commencement of this litigation.
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[R. 1092 (Trial Transcript at 417)].
The third and final element of equitable estoppel is that the defendant's reliance on
the plaintiffs statement would operate to the defendant's detriment if the court allowed
the plaintiff to contradict or repudiate his earlier statement. This is the focus of Tracy's
challenge to the trial court's application of equitable estoppel. See Appellant's Brief at
13-14. Tracy argues that no evidence was presented that Phillip would suffer a detriment
due to his management and distribution of Trust assets in reliance on Tracy's statements
(that he was renouncing his beneficial interest in the Trust and that he would not make a
claim against the Trust) if the trial court allowed Tracy to contradict or repudiate those
statements. See Appellant's Brief at 13-14. However, Tracy completely failed in his
duty to marshal the evidence in this regard.
Tracy's statements and Phillip's reasonable reliance on those statements have
already been established, and there is at the very least a "mere scintilla of evidence" or
"scrap" of evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom which support the trial court's
finding that Phillip would suffer a detriment if Tracy were allowed by the trial court to
contradict or repudiate his statements. See Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, \ 25, 112
P.3d495.
To begin, it is important to note that Phillip served as Trustee of the trust from its
beginning, which included the time period within which Tracy signed the Waiver and
Assignment, and that all actions he took in administering the Trust for those many years
were consistent with his belief and understanding that Tracy was not a beneficiary of the
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Trust, which only left him and Robert as beneficiaries. [R. 1092 (Trial Transcript at
204]. Accordingly, Phillip and Robert consulted with each other regarding Trust activity,
and Robert, who was the only other beneficiary at the time, approved of everything
Phillip did as Trustee, including the sale of the Lehi property. [R. 1092 (Trial Transcript
at 274-75)].
Specifically as one example, Phillip and Robert consulted with each other
regarding the sale of the Lehi property, including their market research for the property,
and the two agreed upon the ultimate price and sale of the same property. [R. 1092 (Trial
Transcript at 275-76)]. It is axiomatic that when all beneficiaries of a trust consent to
certain trust activity they cannot complain about it afterwards. From the evidence
presented at trial, it is clear that Phillip acted or failed to act to his detriment in this regard
because of Tracy's representations that he was renouncing his beneficial interest in the
trust. Tracy tells Phillip and Robert that they can do what they want with the estate and
that he will not pursue his claimed interest, and then sues Phillip claiming that he failed
in his duty as Trustee.
Also, it is undisputed that Tracy called Phillip just before his mother's death to
inquire into and assert his interest or claim to the Trust, resulting in a dispute between the
two. [R. 1092 (Trial Transcript 254-55)]. Shortly thereafter, and after his mother's death,
Tracy, through his letters to Phillip and Robert, represented to Phillip that he and Robert
could do what they wanted with the estate and that he was not going to pursue it. [R.
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1066, 1070 (Findings of Factffl[30, 31); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibits 7, 8); Addendum
Exhibits "E","F"].
Phillip testified at trial that had he not received those letters, he likely would have
sought further legal advice because of Tracy's newly claimed interest in the Trust. [R.
1092 (Trial Transcript at 214, 246)]. Phillip did not sell the Lehi property (the bulk of the
Trust assets) at the price he and Robert agreed upon until after he received the letter from
Tracy. It is unknown what an attorney would have told Phillip regarding Tracy's new
claims to the Trust and his claim that he did not remember signing the Wavier and
Assignment.
Also, Tracy did not receive any distributions from the Trust. [R. 1091 (Trial
Transcript at 87, 170)]. Phillip split the distributions from the Trust between himself and
Robert. [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 172-74, 176)]. In addition, Phillip did not provide
Tracy with an accounting for the Trust. [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 170)]. Furthermore,
Phillip did not have a real property Trust asset appraised prior to selling the Trust
property. [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 171)].
This cursory review of the evidence and all inferences which the Trial Court could
draw therefrom supports the trial court's findings and conclusion that Phillip would suffer
the detriment of breaching his fiduciary duty to Tracy if Tracy were now allowed to
contradict or repudiate his prior statements, relied upon by Phillip in administering the
Trust, that Tracy was renouncing his beneficial interest in the Trust and that he would not
make a claim against the Trust. The implications for Phillip of breaching his fiduciary
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duty are far more serious than just being required to disgorge something he was not
entitled to receive as a beneficiary of the Trust.
For example, the effect of allowing Tracy to repudiate his statements is to create
personal liability in Phillip which is often not dischargeable in bankruptcy when based
upon a breach of fiduciary duty. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(A)(4) (2009). Furthermore,
trustees that have breached their fiduciary duties are subject to removal from the position
of trustee. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-706 (2009). In fact, Tracy specifically sued to
have Phillip removed from serving as the trustee and the appointment of Tracy as the
successor trustee. [R. 1092 (Trial Transcript at 390)]. To breach his fiduciary duty to
Tracy due to his reliance on Tracy's statements would have been detrimental to Phillip.
Another inference to be drawn from the foregoing evidence supporting the trial
court's finding that Phillip would suffer a detriment if the trial court allowed Tracy to
repudiate his prior statements that were relied upon by Phillip in administering the Trust
is that Phillip was forced into a position where he had to speculate as to what he would
have done differently in administering the Trust to defend himself against Tracy's breach
of fiduciary duty claims.
By making statements that he was renouncing his beneficial interest in the Trust
and that he would not make a claim against the Trust, Tracy essentially pulled the rug out
from under Phillip with respect to Phillip's ability to defend himself against a breach of
fiduciary duty claim. Phillip relied upon those statements and would suffer a detriment if
the court allowed Tracy to contradict or repudiate those statements since Phillip would be
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relegated to speculation with respect to what he would have done differently had Tracy
not signed the Waiver and Assignment and not drafted and sent to Phillip and Robert the
two letters in April of 2002.
Lastly, disgorging and returning the money from the Trust distribution is not as
simple as has been argued by Tracy. The Trust does not have the money. The monies
were distributed to the beneficiaries, one of whom, Robert, is not a party to Tracy's
lawsuit.
Based in part upon the foregoing evidence and the inferences to be drawn
therefrom, which represents a scintilla of the evidence, the trial court specifically found
that "Phillip would not have made the Trust property distributions he made or would have
taken other measures had Tracy not signed the Waiver and Assignment and not written
the letters and made the statements therein." [R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact ]f 34)].
These findings of fact led to the trial court's conclusion of law that "Phillip's reliance
(liquidation and distribution of trust assets) on Tracy's statements would operate to
Phillip's detriment if Tracy were allowed now to assert that he did not renounce his
beneficial interest in the Trust." [R. 1066, 1074 (Conclusions of Law ^f 11)].
It is clear that Tracy failed to marshal the evidence. Moreover, the evidence
presented herein from the record establishes that the trial court's findings of fact were not
clearly erroneous and that it did not exceed the bounds of its significant discretion with
respect to its legal conclusion that Phillip would suffer a detriment if Tracy were
permitted by the trial court to assert that he did not renounce his beneficial interest in the
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Trust prior to the filing of the Complaint. As a result, the Court should affirm the trial
court's application of equitable estoppel to the facts of this case.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PHILLIP DID
NOT BREACH A FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LOYALTY TO TRACY.
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary

duty of loyalty to Tracy for two separate reasons: (1) Phillip acted reasonably in light of
all of the facts and circumstances surrounding his administration of the Trust; and (2)
Tracy was equitably estopped from asserting that Phillip breached a fiduciary duty to
Tracy prior to the filing of Tracy's Complaint.
A.

Phillip Acted Reasonably in Administering the Trust.
Tracy's sole argument in asserting that Phillip breached a fiduciary duty of loyalty

to Tracy in making Trust distributions to himself and Robert is that Phillip: (1)
unreasonably relied on Tracy's Waiver and Assignment; (2) unreasonably relied on the
wishes of his deceased mother; and (3) unreasonably relied on Tracy's letters to Phillip
and Robert. See Appellant's Brief at 9-13. However, Tracy has failed to marshal the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact that Phillip acted reasonably in
relying of Tracy's Waiver and Assignment, the wishes of his deceased mother, and
Tracy's letters to Phillip and Robert. Specifically, the trial court made the following
findings of fact:
After Barbara's death and the receipt of Tracy's letter dated April 7, 2002, Phillip
liquidated or sold some real property and distributed those proceeds and a few
other Trust assets equally between himself and Robert under the reasonable belief
that he and Robert were the only beneficiaries of the Trust in reasonable reliance
upon the Waiver and Assignment as well as Tracy's letters stating that Phillip
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and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the estate and that Tracy wasn't
going to anything about it.
[R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact Tl 33)].
Phillip reasonably understood that his mother, Barbara, was to be the sole
owner and/or beneficiary of all of the Trust assets and as such could control
them.
[R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact If 9)].
These findings of fact, in conjunction with the trial court's other findings, formed
the basis for the trial court's conclusion of law that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty
of loyalty to Tracy. [R. 1066, 1074 (Conclusions of Law If 12)]. To challenge that
conclusion of law, Tracy is required to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings of fact. As already noted,
If the application of the standard is extremely fact sensitive, then the reviewing
court should generally give the trial court considerable discretion in determining
whether the facts of a particular case come within the established rule of law.
Even where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a
determination of the correctness of a courts' application of a legal standard is
extremely fact-sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to marshal the evidence.
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 20, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal citations omitted).
The issue of whether Phillip breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy "is a
mixed question of law and fact" for which the trial court is afforded "ample discretion."
Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, If 10, 155 P.3d 917. In this case, whether Phillip
breached his fiduciary duty to Tracy is extremely fact-sensitive as evidenced by the trial
court's findings of fact and the evidence presented over two days of trial to support those
findings of fact. [R. 1066-76; 1091-92 (Trial Transcripts)]. Consequently, Tracy's
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failure to challenge the trial court's findings of fact by marshalling the evidence and
arguing that they were clearly erroneous is fatal to Tracy's legal argument that Phillip
breached a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy.
Furthermore, the Court cannot rely on a few out-of-context facts from the record
in evaluating whether the trial court exceeded its "ample discretion" in concluding as a
matter of law that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy. Indeed, the
Court must consider all of the facts and circumstances surrounding Phillip's
administration of the Trust. Since Tracy has not argued that the trial court's findings of
fact were clearly erroneous (or marshaled the evidence as would be required to make
such an argument), references shall be made hereafter to findings of fact instead of to the
record inasmuch as "it is presumed the findings of fact of the trial court are supported by
evidence." See Clark v. Jennings, 98 P.2d 348, 348 (Utah 1940).
On September 13, 1989, a Trust Agreement drafted by attorney Dale M. Dorius
was executed by Don and Barbara, as husband and wife, for the purpose of creating a
Trust. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of
Factfflf1,2)]. The Trust Agreement provided that Phillip, Robert, and Tracy were
beneficiaries of the Trust. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. 1066,
1067 (Findings of Fact ]f 3)]. Robert is Barbara's son from a previous marriage, Tracy is
Don's son from a previous marriage, and Phillip is the son of both Don and Barbara. [R.
1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact \ 4)].
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The Trust Agreement provided for Phillip to serve as the Trustee of the Trust. [R.
1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact 1j 5)]. As
Trustee, Phillip was to disburse to Don and Barbara "such amounts from the principal or
income of the Trust Estate as they shall from time to time direct" during their lifetimes.
[R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact ^ 6)].
However, Don and Barbara's marriage was dissolved by a Decree of Divorce
issued by Judge Gunnell on November 4, 1991. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); Addendum
Exhibit "B"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact ^ 7)]. This Decree of Divorce mandated
that Barbara was to be the sole beneficiary of the Trust and directed "the Trustee, Phillip
D. Southwick, to do whatever is necessary to . . . make Barbara P. Southwick the sole
beneficiary of the assets in the trust as her sole and separate property." [R. 1008 (Def.
Exhibit 3); Addendum Exhibit "B"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact H 8)].
Phillip was aware of the divorce proceedings while they were pending and was
aware of the result of the divorce at the time it was issued and relied upon the Decree of
Divorce in performing his duties as Trustee of the Trust going forward. [R. 1066, 1068
(Findings of Fact ^ 9)]. Specifically, Phillip reasonably understood that his mother,
Barbara, was to be the sole owner and/or beneficiary of all of the Trust assets and as such
could control them. [R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact f 9)].
According to the Utah Supreme Court,
When the court has cognizance of the controversy, as it appears from the
pleadings, and has the parties before it, then the judgment or order, which is
authorized by the pleadings, however, erroneous, irregular or informal it may be,
is valid until set aside or reversed upon appeal or writ of error. This doctrine is
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founded upon reason and the 'soundest principles of public policy.'" Kramer v.
Pixton, 268 P. 1029, 1034 (Utah 1928). Furthermore, the Uniform Law Comments
to Utah Code § 75-7-1006 establishes that "a trustee's reliance on the trust
instrument would not be justified if the trustee is aware of a prior court decree . . .
changing the terms of the trust."
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-1006 (2009) (Uniform Law Comments).
Accordingly, it would have been entirely unreasonable for Phillip to disregard the
Decree of Divorce and its effect on Tracy's beneficial interest in administering the Trust.
Consistent with the Decree of Divorce, Don and Barbara signed a document referred to
herein as the Joint Release that directed Phillip "to convey and transfer all of the assets
located in [the Trust] to Barbara P. Southwick as the sole beneficiary under the terms of
said Trust Agreement." [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 5); Addendum Exhibit "C": R. 1066,
1068 (Findings of Fact ]flj 10,11)]. Barbara delivered, and Phillip approved and accepted
into the Trust, the signed Joint Release on or about December 12, 1991. [R. 1066, 1068
(Findings ofFacttH 12,13)].
On January 31, 1992, Tracy signed a document which had been prepared by
attorney Dale M. Dorius which is referred to herein as the Waiver and Assignment. In
signing the Waiver and Assignment, Tracy purported to renounce "any claim he may
have in any of the Trust Estate including income and/or principal, all cash including bank
accounts, and all proceeds from life insurance policies and further[] said Trustee to
distribute his share of the Trust Estate to PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK." [R. 1008 (Def.
Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fad f 16)]. Barbara
delivered the Waiver and Assignment to Phillip, who as Trustee approved and accepted
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the Waiver and Assignment into the Trust on March 12, 1992. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6);
Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact If 17)].
At that time, Phillip knew that attorney Dale Dorius had prepared the Trust and
other Trust documents, had advised Don and Barbara off and on regarding the Trust, and
had prepared the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact % 17)].
Furthermore, Phillip knew that a Decree of Divorce had been issued mandating that
Phillip do whatever is necessary to . . . make Barbara P. Southwick the sole beneficiary of
the assets in the trust as her sole and separate property." [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 3);
Addendum Exhibit "B"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact 1j 8)].
Based upon these facts and circumstances, it was entirely reasonable for Phillip to
accept Tracy's Waiver and Assignment and to conclude that Tracy was no longer a
beneficiary of the Trust and should not receive distributions from the Trust. In asserting
that it was unreasonable for Phillip to rely on the Waiver and Assignment, Tracy makes
the following arguments: (1) the Trust Agreement prohibited any assignment of any
interest in the Trust by a beneficiary such as Tracy pursuant to its spendthrift provision;
(2) Phillip did not contact Tracy to confirm whether or not Tracy desired to disclaim his
interest in the Trust; (3) Tracy denied signing the Wavier and Assignment in the summer
of 2001; and (4) the trial court concluded that the Waiver and Assignment did not comply
with the statutory requirements for a disclaimer. See Appellee's Brief at 10, 12.
These arguments as to why Phillip's reliance on the Wavier and Assignment was
unreasonable are without merit. First, Utah's Disclaimer Statute provided that "[t]he
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right to disclaim [a beneficial interest in a tmst] exists notwithstanding any limitation on
the interest of the disclaimant in the nature of a spendthrift provision or similar
restriction." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802 (1991). Furthermore, at that time the
spendthrift provision of the Trust was subordinate to the Decree of Divorce. As already
noted, it would have been unreasonable for Phillip to disregard the Decree of Divorce and
its effect on Tracy's beneficial interest in administering the Trust.
In addition, a spendthrift provision is intended to guard the interest of the
beneficiaries and the trust corpus from creditors and other third parties so as to not
jeopardize the trust assets. Its purpose is not to prevent a beneficiary from transferring
his beneficial interest to the trustee in order to disclaim his interest in the Trust.
Second, Phillip did not act unreasonably by not contacting Tracy to confirm
whether or not Tracy desired to disclaim his interest in the Trust upon receiving the
Waiver and Assignment from Barbara in light of the existence of the Decree of Divorce
and its mandate that Phillip take the steps necessary to make Barbara the sole beneficiary
of the Trust.
Third, the trial court specifically found that Tracy's testimony that he did not sign
the Wavier and Assignment was "unconvincing and appeared to be for the purposes of
this litigation rather than from knowledge or remembrance." [R. 1066, 1073
(Conclusions of Law ^ 7).] With the trial court's finding concerning Tracy's credibility
in mind, it was not unreasonable for Phillip, receiving a call from Tracy ten years after
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the entry of the Decree of Divorce and the signing of the Waiver and Assignment, to have
questioned Tracy's newfound assertion that he did not sign the Wavier and Assignment.
Finally, Phillip did not have the benefit of the trial court's conclusion that the
Waiver and Assignment did not comply with the statutory requirements for a disclaimer
until after the bench trial in this matter. Taking into account that the Decree of Divorce
was issued by a judge and that Tracy's Waiver and Assignment was prepared by an
attorney, it was not unreasonable for Phillip to proceed on the basis that the Tracy's
Waiver and Assignment was valid and enforceable for purposes of complying with the
directive given to Phillip in the Decree of Divorce to take the steps necessary to make
Barbara the sole beneficiary of the Trust.
Phillip believed that the Decree of Divorce was a valid directive requiring that
Barbara become the sole Trustor and sole Beneficiary of the Trust, and that as a result she
was free to modify and/or terminate the Trust and/or control the property at her
discretion. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact U 24)]. Thereafter, Barbara told Phillip that
she planned and intended to carry on with the Trust, since Don and Tracy were no longer
beneficiaries, in order to avoid potential federal tax consequences associated with having
all of the Trust property transferred to her individually and to avoid the inconvenience
and cost of setting up a new trust. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact ^j 25)]. She also told
Phillip that it was her intent and desire that Robert and Phillip receive the trust property
upon her death and that accordingly they remain as beneficiaries of the Trust and that the
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property would be evenly split between Phillip and Robert upon her death. [R. 1066,
1070 (Findings of Fact 126)].
For these reasons, Phillip reasonably believed it unnecessary to transfer all of the
Trust property from a trust which purportedly no longer named Don or Tracy as
beneficiaries into a second trust of the same status. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact ^
27)]. As a result of Barbara's expression of her plans and intent, Phillip and Robert did
not ever purport to renounce their interests in the Trust, nor were they asked to renounce
their interest in the Trust. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact If 28)].
In asserting that Phillip breached his duty of loyalty to Tracy when he made
distributions from the Trust to himself and P^obert, Tracy argues that it was unreasonable
for Phillip to rely on the wishes of his deceased mother. This argument ignores the
reality of the Decree of Divorce and its mandate that Phillip take the steps necessary to
make Barbara the sole beneficiary of the Trust. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); Addendum
Exhibit "B"]. Since it was reasonable for Phillip to administer the Trust as if Barbara
was the sole trustor and beneficiary of the Trust—it would have been unreasonable for
Phillip to ignore the Decree of Divorce—it was also reasonable for Phillip to rely on
Barbara's wishes, including her wishes that upon her death Robert and Phillip become the
only beneficiaries of the Trust, pursuant to the reasonable belief that she had absolute
power to modify the Trust.
Barbara died in February of 2002. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fad If 29)]. In a
letter addressed to and received by Phillip dated April 7, 2002, which was drafted over
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ten years after Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment, Tracy wrote that he did not
remember whether or not he signed the Waiver and Assignment, that he was not going to
do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted
with the Trust assets. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 7); Addendum Exhibit "E"; R. 1066, 1070
(Findings of Fact ]f 30)]. In a letter addressed to and received by Robert dated April 20,
2002, Tracy again wrote that he did not remember whether or not he signed the Waiver
and Assignment, that he was not going to do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip
and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the Trust assets. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit
8); Addendum Exhibit "F"; R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact 131)].
Tracy also argues that it was unreasonable for Phillip to rely on Tracy's letters
when he made distributions from the Trust to himself and Robert. According to the trial
court, "Tracy's letters to Phillip and Robert in April 2002, at least six separate times in
those two letters, say that Tracy will not assert a claim. They say it in several ways, but
they say it at least six times in the two letters." [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 417 (Trial
Court's Ruling))].
If Tracy believed that he still was a beneficiary of the Trust, it was unreasonable
for Tracy to draft two letters stating that he did not remember whether or not he signed
the Waiver and Assignment, that he was not going to do anything about the Trust, and
that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the Trust assets. When Tracy
drafted the letters to Phillip and Robert, ten years had passed and the Decree of Divorce
had not been declared invalid and Tracy's Waiver and Assignment had not been declared
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ineffective. As a result, it was reasonable for Phillip to rely on Tracy's letters in
determining that it was proper to make distributions from the Trust to himself and Robert.
Tracy's final argument in support of his assertion that Phillip breached a fiduciary
duty of loyalty to Tracy is that Phillip failed to prudently administer the Trust. See
Appellant's Brief at 12. In support of this argument, Tracy asserts that "[pjrudence
requires that Phillip should have sought a determination by the court as to Tracy's status
as a beneficiary." See id. This assertion ignores the fact that a court had already passed
judgment on Tracy's status as a beneficiary of the Trust by mandating that Phillip take
whatever actions were necessary to divest Tracy of his status as a beneficiary of the
Trust. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); Addendum Exhibit "B"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of
Fact If 8)].
Phillip's actions in administering the Trust were consistent with the Decree of
Divorce, the Joint Release, the Waiver and Assignment, the representations he received
from Barbara, and the letters drafted by Tracy in April of 2002. In light of the foregoing
facts and the attendant circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its ample discretion in
concluding that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy in
administering the Trust.
B.

Tracy is Estopped from Asserting that Phillip Breached a Fiduciary Duty.
In asserting that Phillip breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy by making

distributions from the Trust to Phillip and Robert, Tracy did not address the trial court's
conclusion of law that Tracy is "estopped from making any claims against the Trust or
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Phillip individually or as Trustee related to Trust distributions or management prior to the
filling of the Complaint." [R. 1066, 1074 (Conclusions of Law 114)]. Having failed to
challenge this conclusion of law or the findings of fact in support thereof, the Court
should affirm the trial court's application of equitable estoppel to the issue of whether
Phillip breached a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy by making distributions from the
Trust to Phillip and Robert prior to the filing of Tracy's Complaint.
IV.

AFFIRMATION ON OTHER GROUNDS.
The Utah Supreme Court articulated the standard whereby a judgment may be

affirmed on alternative grounds as follows:
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if
it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of
its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged
or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not
considered or passed on by the lower court.
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ]fl0, 52 P.3d 1158 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). In this case, the trial court's judgment—that Tracy is a beneficiary of the Trust
but that he is not entitled to claim an interest in pre-Complaint distributions or to assert
that Phillip breached his fiduciary duties—should be affirmed since Phillip was required
to act pursuant to the directive given to Phillip by the Decree of Divorce issued by Judge
Gunnell on November 4, 1991. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit \ 3); Addendum Exhibit "B"; R.
1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact If 8)].
When the court has cognizance of the controversy, as it appears from the
pleadings, and has the parties before it, then the judgment or order, which is
authorized by the pleadings, however, erroneous, irregular or informal it may be,
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is valid until set aside or reversed upon appeal or writ of error. This doctrine is
founded upon reason and the 'soundest principles of public policy.'
Kramer v. Pixton, 268 P. 1029, 1034 (Utah 1928). Furthermore, the Uniform Law
Comments to Utah Code § 75-7-1006 establishes that "a trustee's reliance on the trust
instrument would not be justified if the trustee is aware of a prior court decree . ..
changing the terms of the trust." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-1006 (2009) (Uniform
Law Comments).
The Decree of Divorce mandated that Barbara was to be the sole beneficiary of the
Trust. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit % 3); Addendum Exhibit "B"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of
Fact TJ 8)]. This mandate superseded the terms of the Trust and was legitimately relied
upon by Phillip in administering the Trust until the trial court in this case held that the
Decree of Divorce did not operate to terminate Tracy's beneficial interest in the Trust.
[R. 517-23 (Memorandum Decision)]. As a result, Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty
to Tracy by administering the Trust as though Tracy were not a beneficiary since Phillip
could not justifiably disregard the Decree of Divorce. Furthermore, Tracy should not be
entitled to assert that he was a beneficiary of the Trust prior to the filing of the Complaint
in this matter since the Decree of Divorce was valid until it was set aside by the trial court
after the filing of the Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Phillip respectfully requests that the Court conclude
that Tracy's status as a beneficiary of the Trust was terminated by virtue of his execution
of the Waiver and Assignment and/or the letters Tracy sent to Phillip and Robert. In the
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alternative, Phillip respectfully requests that the Court: (1) affirm the trial court's
conclusion that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty to Tracy; and (2) find that the trial
court's conclusion that Phillip suffered a detriment by relying on Tracy's statements was
supported by evidence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this |i£9ay of July, 2010.
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TRUST AGREEMENT
DON

B.

SOUTHWICK

Tiemont Street,

and BARBARA P.

Tremonton,

Box Elder County,

referred to as the Trustors,
te

PHILLIP D.

84337,

911

North

Utah, hereinafter

hereby transfer and assign in 'filia-

SOUTHWICK of 1150

hereinafter

SOUTHWICK of

referred

S.

660

to as the

W.,

Tremonton,

Trustee,

the

Utah

ptop<-uLy

described in Schedule "A" attached hereto.
All
this

property now or hereafter subject to the provisions

instrument

shall

be

held,

managed

and

of

distill; ;tc:! -"-

hereinafter provided.
ARTICLE I
Distribution
1.

Lifetime

Trustors,

the

benefit,

such

of

Trustee

Trustors>

During the
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Rights Reserved by Trustors
1«
Trustors,

Neither

the

may alter,

Trustors

or

any

person

on b^haif-.

amend or revoke this Trust in y^hoic en

part during the lifetime of the Trustors,

during incompetency

the Trustors, or after the death of the Trustors.

• h°

2.
to

Adding to Trust.

time,

The Trustors at any time, or from tim"

or by testamentary disposition may add to

this

TruM

other property which, when accepted by the Trustee, shall become
a

part of the Trust Estate to be held in trust under

the

teunr;

and provisions of this Agreement.
3#

Restrictions

on

Sale and

Reinvestment.

l'urluq tlr*

lifetime of the Trustors, the Trustee shall make no sale or o\•Indisposition

of

investment
shall

be

any

make

no

of any money held in the said Ttust Estate except

m

designated

however,

that

property of the Trust Estate

in writing

by

the

and

Trustors.

Fi.ovid'vl,

in the event of the incompetency of the Trustors,

this paragraph shall not apply and the Trustee shall exorcise h.is
discretion without the written consent of the Trustors.
ARTICLE III
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conferred by law and including

the

any

following

powers:
1.
only
in

Limitation on Investments.

To invest the Trust Estate

in secured savings accounts and/or certificates of
banks or savings and loan associations in which the

deposit
deposits

are insured by the Federal Goverrunent unless otherwise authorized
by the Trustors•

2«

Payment of Expenses.

To pay taxes, assessments and all

other expenses incurred in the administration of the Trust Estate
and

the

protection thereof against legal or

including

equitable

attack,

counsel fees and reasonable compensation for

his ov/n

services*
3.
what

Determination

is

To

determine

principal and income of the Trust Estate and

'ipportion

and allocate,
between

these

of Principal and Income.

in his discretion,
accounts

except

receipts and disbursements
insofar as

the

Trustee

as

shall

exercise the discretion herein conferred, and except as otherwise
provided
income

in this instrument,

matters relating to principal

shall be governed by the provisions of the

Utah

and

Unifmm

Principal and Income Act from time to time existing.
4.

No

hereunder,
for

the

Bond

No Trustee or successor

Trust'™,

shall be required to give any bond or other

security

faithful

Required*

performance

of

their

duties,

powers nn'1

discretions.
ARTICLE IV
General Provisions
1.

be treated as any other income.

undistributed
or

of Income and Proration of

iw-'w*

Expenses.

or unpaid on trust property when received in'o the Tmrt-

accrued
shall

Accrual

estate

entitled

Income accrued

by the Trustee at the termination of any

under this Trust shall go to the
to

the next eventual interest in

which they take such Interest.

or

intere f

beneficiaries
the

h"M

n?::t

proportions

in

5.
this

Spendthrift Provision*

Trust

is

Each and every beneficialy under

hereby restrained from,

and are

without right, power or authority to sell,
pledge,

and

transfer,

shall

be

mortgage,

hypothecate, anticipate or in any other manner effect or

impair his,

her,

or their beneficial or legal

interests,

claims,

and

estates

in

rights,

and to the

titles,

income

and/or

principal of this Trust during the entire term, hereof; nor shall
the rights,

titles,

interests,

claims,

or estates of any such

beneficiary

be subject to the rights or claims of creditors

nor

subject nor liable to the process of law or court*
6.

Designation

of Trustee.

It is understood and

agreed

that said PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK shall act as Trustee so long a* he
is

living

and

competent-

In

incompetency of said PHILLIP D.
810

Cottonwood

Drive,

as

successor

event

SOUTHWICK,

South Webet,

SOUTHWICK of 150 Jeremy Street,
appointed

the

of

the

ROBERT S.

Utah 84405

and

Salt Lake City,

Co-Trustees

by a

death

flEl.liRR of
TRACY

Utah,

court

of

or

I,.

shaJJ hcompel°ni

jurisdiction.
7•
Trustee

Trustee

Entitled

to Expenses and

Compensation.

shall be entitled to reasonable expenses and

compensation for services performed as Trustee,

'ih"

xeasonnM^

to be paid

f?"m

the Trust Estate.
8

*

Definitions.

The words "child", "children" and

as used herein, shall include legally adopted children.

n

i^u-M

Thn word

"issue" shall also include lineal descendants indefinitely.
The

words "Trustee or Trustees" are used interclmngabJy and

PsnnnnnK

mean

an original Trustee or Trustees and any successor 01; nddo<!

Trustee or Trustees.
9.
this

Separability of Trust Provisions.

Agreement is unenforceable,

If any provision of

the remaining provisions shall

nevertheless be carried into effect.
10*

Law Governing Trust.

This Trust has been accepted by

the Trustee in the State of Utah;
in

this instrument,

and unless otherwise, provided

its validity,

construction and all

rights

under it shall be governed by the laws of that state.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
P.
\^

SOUTHWICK,
y

have

the said,

executed

day of ^ T j p r

r 1989

DON B. SOUTHWICK and BARBARA

this Agreement in duplicate
at

\

C^AVIM-VCT(\_

this

, Utah.

^ N % ^pJvwvAl^
Signed in the presence of!
<v^
•"") <~^)

DON B. SOUTHWIClT
Trustor

(.>;-

-£"

//

/

/y

f . -/'

•./

BARBARA P. SOUTHWICK
Trustor

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF Yutt f k r

)

j eg

On

the \1b y day of c-<\,(S\r

before me DON B.

,

1989,

personally

app'.v-u~'l

SOUTHWICK and BARBARA P. SOUTHWICK, the .'J.Ujri'M X

Donnnnn-7

of the within instrument,

who duly acknowledged to me that

they

executed the same.

(•/{

ccv::?5Rn

\r.r

c^NOTARy PUBLIC

SUSAII R. FUGS'IY
;*IM';M.".I /1.-7J
n:vo*uwi 'W/*';ff

Residing at

-.-A

^"g^g^ft

s (\v.viii ,.
W - ; ^ . ^ - ^ , \ \\ -

Expires:

Psnnnnna

SCHEDULE "A"
ATTACHED TO THE SOUTHWICK FAMILY TRUST
Dated September 13r 1989

1.

11.93 Acres farm land located in Lehi,
more particulary described as follows:

Utah County, Utah and

Commencing at a point 13 chains West and 4.54 chains South
of the Northeast corner of the Southeast quarter of Section
20, Township 5 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; thence East 5.75 chains; thence South 20.75
chains; thence West 5.75 chains; thence North 20.75 chains
to the point of beginning.
Together with six (6) shares of the Capital Stock
Spring Creek Irrigation Company.
2.

26 acres zange land located in Utah County,
particularly described as follows:

of

Utah and

the
more

The North 26 acres of the East Half of the Southeast quarter
of Section 13, Township 5 South, Range 3 West of the Salt
Lake Base and Meridan.
3.

80 acres range land located in Utah County,
particularly described as follows:

Utah

and more

NW1/4 of NW1/4 of Sec. 21, T. 4 S., R. 3 W., SLM; & SW1/4
of NW1/4 of Sec. 21, T. 4 S., R. 3 W., SLM. Area 80 acres.
4.

Residence located at 911 North Tremont, Tremonton, Box Elder
County, Utah and more particularly described as follows:
Lot 16, Block 2, Amended Plat W, Tremonton Townsite Survey,
Box Elder County, Utah, according to the official plat
thereof.
Subject to any taxes or assessments now or hereafter levied
by any taxing unit.
SUBJECT TO a first mortgage to the First Security Bank of
Utah, National Association for $14,650.00 dated October 3,
1961 in the office of the County Recorder of Box Elder
County, Utah October 9, 1961 in Book 153 of Mortgage Records
at Page 110, which mortgage the grantees agree to assume and
pay in accordance with the terms thereof.

5.

11.5 acres farm land and minor subdivision at Tremonton, Box
Elder County, Utah and more particularly described as
follows:

9

Beginning at a point on the North right of way line of a
frontage road 1045.3 feet East along the section line and
284.2 feet North of the S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 11 N. ,
R. 3 W,, SLB&M said point being on the grantor's East line,
and running North 57* 31f 30" West along said frontage road
line 530.9 feet; thence Northwesterly 235.6 feet along the
arc of a
539.96 foot radius curve to the right along said
line; thence North 32* 31f 30" West 38.0 feet along said
line; thence North 306.0 feet; thence North 1* 44? West
226.0 feet; thence North 87* 15f East 607.5 feet; thence
South 1* 44f East 1047.3 feet to the point of beginning,
containing 11.50 acres.
There are four (4) lots along the bottom of the above 11.50
acres more particularly described as follows:
LOT 1
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and 284.2 feet North
from the S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W., SLB&M
and running N 57*31'30" W alona said line 168.37 feet;
thence N 10*00'00" E."381.93 feet; thence 575*00'00" E 63.40
feet; thence S 1*44' E 450.00 feet to the point of
beginning, containing 1.00 acre, reserving an easement for a
drainage ditch 10 feet wide along the East side.
LOT 2
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and thence North
284.2 feet and thence N 57*31'30" W 168.37 feet from the
S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W., SLB&M to the
true point of beginning and running N 57*31'30" W along said
line 134.10 feet; thence N 10*00'00" E 321.38 feet; thence S
84*17'00" E 124.26 feet; thence S 10*00'00" W 381.93 feet to
the point of beginning, containing 1.00 acre.
LOT 2
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and thence North
284.2 feet and thence N 57*31'30" W 302.47 feet from the
S.W. corner of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W., SLB&M to the
true point of beginning and running N 57*31'30" W 125.00
feet; thence 40.16 feet along a curve to the right of 40.0
foot radius (Note:
Chord to said curve bears N 28*45'45" W
38.50 feet) thence North 213.00 feet; thence East 179.78
feet; thence S 10*00'00" W 321.38 feet to the point of
beginning, containing 0.99 acre.
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LOT 1
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road
1045.3 feet East along the Section
line and thence North
284.2 feet and thence N 57*31 f 30" W 530.9 feet and thence N
56*20' W 72.0 feet from the S.W. Corner of Section 10, T.
11 N. , R. 3 W., SLB&M to the true point of beginning and
running 167.82 feet along a 539.96 foot radius curve to the
right; (Note:
Chord to said curve bears N 42*56'15" W
167.15 feet) thence N 32*31 f 30" W 38.0 feet; thence North
107.75 feet; thence East 200.00 feet; thence South 231.52
feet; thence 90.76 feet along a 40.0 foot radius curve to
the right to the point of beginning, containing 1.00 acre.
r? 6.
,9^

All that part beginning at a point on West right of way line
of County Road and the North right of way line of Utah-Idaho
Sugar Co. West Canal, which point is 1095 feet North, 33
feet West of Southeast Corner of Northeast Quarter of
Section 1, Township 11 North, Range 4 West,
Salt Lake
Meridian, and running thence North 85* 25f West 188 feet
along the Canal right
of way, thence North 460.9 feet,
thence North 86* 00T East 188 feet to the County Road right
o£ way line, thence South along said line to the point of
beginning. EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING:
Beginning at a point on the West right of way line of the
County Road and the North right of way line of the UtahIdaho Sugar Co. West Canal, which point is 1095 feet North,
33 feet West of the Southeast corner of the Northeast
Quarter of said Section 1, thence North 85* 25' West 188
feet along the Canal right of way, thence North 257.9 feet,
thence North 86* 00' East 188 feet to the County Road right
of way line, thence South along said line to the point of
beginning.

$

>M/7.
L>

Lot 47, Block 4, Beginning N. 0' and W. 8f of the S.E. Corner,
thence W. 16', thence N. 3 1/2', thence E. 16', thence S.
3 1/2' to P.O.B.
2 spaces, incl. P.M. in the Provo City
Cemetery.

,>^-8.

Lot 1, Block 12, in the Lehi City Cemetery.
Remaining interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract
between Don B. Southwick & Barbara P. Southwick, husband and
wife, as the Sellers, and Ed Muir & Lorraine Muir, his wife,
as the Buyers, dated March 1, 1979, marked Exhibit "A"
attached hereto.
Including a 1958 house trailer, Make Vendale,
Identification
Number V-2906Y102.
One used
electric range.
One 105,000 BTU gas furnace.
Escrow is
being held by Brigham Realty Inc. at 83 S. Main, Brigham
City, Utah.

11
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1972 Ideal house trailer, S/N 1S3325
1975 GMC 1-ton farm truck, Model C35C35, VIN YCY335Z501303
1979 Luv pickup truck, VIN CRN1498285318
1987 Century Buick Sedan automobile, 1G4AL51WXH6418162
1972 two-horse trailer, Make - ROC, I.D. 710156HT
John Deere Model "A" tractor, S/N 631171, approx. 45 years
old
John Deere Model "A" tractor, S/N 574169, approx. 55 years
old
24 shares of capital stock in the Lehi Spring Creek
Irrigation Company, Lehi, Utah. No. 30
20.80 shares in Bear River Water Distribution Company,
Tremonton, Utah. No. 3589
85 shares in The Western States Machine Company.

No. 1754

Guns:
300 Savage, S/N 558898
300 Savage, S/N 397006 w/t scope
308 Savage, S/N 1085641 w/t scope
Remington 12 gauge, Model 870, S/N 394415V
Marlin 22 rifle, Model 39-A
Sharps rifle, 50 calibre, S/N C23407 (1948)
Ruger pistol, 357 Mag., S/N 157-86346
S&W 22 calibre pistol, S/N 116056
S&W 357 Mag. calibre, Mod. 27-2, S/N N327396
20 gauge Ranger shotgun, S/N 105-21
22 rifle, Steven Model 56
410 gauge shotgun, Stevens Model 59A
12 gauge shotgun, Remington Model 10A
2
1
1
2

saddles made by Utahn Saddle Co., approx. 10 - 12 yrs. old
youth saddle
pack saddle
each bridles, halters, ropes, chaps, and saddle bags

Electric welder made by Forney and accessories
Hand tools and wrenches
1966 Metro truck, Model 1200, S/N 551211L006182

12

1
1
1
1

buckskin mare, born 1971, Lady Bar Deck 71, #887509
black gelding, born 1975, Little Tomm Hawk, #1122182
bay mare
yearling buckskin gelding, born August 1988

All cattle with Rafter S on left hip thigh.
mark are registered to Don B. Southwick
Bank Accounts:
Logan Savings & Loan:
Logan Savings & Loan:
Sandia Federal Savings
Sandia Federal Savings

#0303 60073915
#0203 60083711
& Loan: #064 7010568
& Loan: #061 3205050

13
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PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337
VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT
Attorney for Defendant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2464

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DON B. SOUTHWICK,
Plaintiff,

/
/

DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.

/

BARBARA P. SOUTHWICK,

/

Civil No.

Defendant.

/

Judge F. L. Gunnell

9Q00QQ252DA

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on
the 18th-day of October, 1991, before the Honorable F. L.
Gunnell, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court,
sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff not appearing
in person, nor with his attorney, and the Defendant
appearing in person and with her attorney, Pete N.
Vlahos, and Plaintiff's attorney having withdrawn as
attorney for the Plaintiff by written Motion and Order
and said Motion and Order was filed in open Court by the
Defendant's attorney, and it having been shown to the
Court that the Defendant was duly served with a copy of
the Complaint and a copy of the Summons, and wherein the
DECREE OF DIVORCE
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK
Civil No.: 900000252DA
Defendant having answered same within the time allotted
by statute, and wherein the Stipulation of the parties
herein settling all of their property rights, alimony,
support, attorney fees, Court costs and other kindred
matters, and more than three (3) months having elapsed
from the date of the filing of the Complaint, and the
testimony of the Defendant having been heard in open
Court, and the Court having been fully informed in the
premises, and having made its Findings of Fact and
.^0

Conclusions of Law, separately stated in writing, NOW

I

THEREFORE,

_J

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

CO
>
J LU

z
cc

Z Q

o §8

o

Defendant, Barbara P. Southwick, is granted a Decree of
Divorce from the Plaintiff, Don B'. Southwick, same to
become final upon the signing and entry.

>

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
said Decree of Divorce shall incorporate herein all
matters of property rights, alimony, support, attorney
fees, Court costs and other kindred matters that are
contained in the Stipulation and Agreement of the parties
herein and same is set forth as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff and Defendant shall direct

the Trustee, Phillip D. Southwick, who resides at 1150
South

660 West

DECREE OF DIVORCE

in

Tremonton, Utah, to

convey

the

2
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK
Civil No.: 900000252DA
necessary documents that will convey all of the property
presently in said trust to the Defendant, and that the
Defendant shall be the recipient and the sole beneficiary
under the Trust Agreement, and that the Plaintiff shall
have no further right or claim as a beneficiary in the
assets that have been placed in said Trust Agreement.
2.

That both parties jointly shall give written

notice to the Trustee, Phillip D. Southwick, to do
X

whatever is np.nessary to remove the Plaintiff. Don B.

1

V

^
.fco

Southwick, as a beneficiary under the Trust Agreement and

fe

fc

LAW

1'"*

make Barbara P. Southwick the sole beneficiary of the

M

<
*x >\

assets in the trust as her sole and separate property.

CO

<S

QJl

~ei z
00
«s

H
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3.

That the Plaintiff specifically acknowledges

Z Q

S§
CO

that the Defendant shall receive the following real" and
personal

property

that

is

presently

in

the

Trust

Agreement as the sole beneficiary, and does convey all of
his right, title and interest in and to the trust assets
and waives any claim as a beneficiary thereunder.
4. That said Trust Agreement includes the following
real property, to-wit:
(a)

11.93

acres of

land, with

24 shares of

irrigation water located in Lehi, Utah.
(b)

80 acres of range land and 26 acres of range

land located in West Canyon, Utah County, Utah.
DECREE OF DIVORCE
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK
Civil No-: 900000252DA
(c) Lots 3 and 4 being part of 11.5 acres of land
located

at

approximately

1100

Tremonton, Utah, including

South

850

West

in

4.96 hours of irrigation

water.
(d)

The equity in the family home at 911 North

Tremont located in Tremonton, Utah, which has an equity
of $14,500.00, and the Plaintiff shall sell said home
without any commission and shall bring all mortgage
payments current to the date of sale, provided however
Defendant shall vacate the home within thirty (30) days
after the divorce is granted.

That if the family home

does not bring a net of $14,500.00 equity

for the

Defendant, the Plaintiff shall reimburse the Defendant
from his own personal assets all sums up to $14,500.00 so
that the Defendant

shall

receive

a net

equity

of

$14,500.00.
(e) Five lots in Lot 1 Block 12, Lehi Cemetery.
5.

That Plaintiff shall assume the Nadine Peters'

note of $26,000.00 for the 9 1/2 acres, with 9.54 hours
of water, which is part of the 11.5 acres of land set
forth in item (c) hereinabove.
6. That the Plaintiff shall convey and do whatever
is

legally

proper

and

necessary

to convey

to

the

Defendant all other items of real and personal property
DECREE OF DIVORCE
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK
Civil No-: 900000252DA
as listed on the family Trust Agreement and all other
items presently owned by the trust by and between the two
(2) beneficiaries, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P.
Southwick,

designated

respectively herein.

as

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

That the Plaintiff shall further

convey to the Defendant all items of real and personal
property, except as to those items he shall retain that
is not included in the trust and all items of real and
property included in the trust to the Defendant as her

*-*A

•S«A

. 0
l^""*

fc
•(X
i-

sole and separate property,
LAW

fe

7. That the Plaintiff shall receive as his sole and

H-

<
>
LU

separate property all of his clothes, small personal

V)

Zj OUJ
Z Q

yj o
<o tH
O
xi
#s

<3

>*—i

>

items, such as toiletries, etc., and that the Plaintiff

_i O

is also awarded the 1980 Luv pickup truck as his sole and
separate property.
8. That the Plaintiff shall manage and take care of
the business building until the bank makes a decision as
to the disposition and said agreement is finalized and
further shall defend any lawsuit sought by the bank for
the foreclosure on said property.

That the Plaintiff

shall be entitled to receive the rental income during the
interim and shall also manage said business building
until that matter is disposed of, either by foreclosure
or sale, and the Plaintiff shall divide the rental income
DECREE OF DIVORCE
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK
Civil No.: 900000252DA
from

the

building

equally

between

Plaintiff

and

Defendant, minus the reasonable expenses necessary in
maintaining the building, which the Plaintiff shall
furnish the Defendant a full accounting of,
9.

That the Plaintiff shall further pay to the

Defendant the sum of $145.00 per month as and for
alimony, payable each month on or before the 15th day of
the month, commencing with the month of October. That in
•u-i

addition, shall pay to the Defendant a proportionate

-5
.°o

increase of his social security benefits as additional
LAW

* r^

alimony as he receives any additional payments in his

<
>

social security, and that the intent is to attempt to

fc H
-a

CO

bo
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H
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-J

equalize the income the parties are receiving for marital

za
O

assets, provided however the alimony shall terminate upon
the death of the Defendant or the Defendant's remarriage.

— _>

>

10.

That the Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant's

attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, the sum of $500.00 as and for
partial

attorney

fees

for

the

preparation

of

the

Stipulation, plus presenting the matter to the Court and
preparing the subsequent papers granting to the parties
the divorce.
11. That the Defendant further shall bring current
and pay the property taxes on the 11.5 acres of land
located in Tremonton and on the land located in Utah
DECREE OF DIVORCE
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK
Civil No-: 900000252DA
County, said taxes shall be for the years 1990 and 1991*
12- That the Plaintiff shall further provide to the
Defendant the necessary cash at the execution of the
Stipulation,

to

bring current

the delinquent house

payments on the family home, which is located at 911
North Tremont in Tremonton, Utah.
13.

That the Defendant shall utilize the trust

properties to attempt to satisfy any deficiency that
might

arise

from

the

business

building,

which

is

presently being foreclosed upon, if the trust properties
are still in existence at the time of the final judgment
and shall utilize said assets if they are in existence
and

if

the

Defendant

has

control

over

said

trust

properties to attempt to satisfy any deficiency on the
pending foreclosure, provided however that if she does
not have any control over the assets in the trust, then
she would not be obligated to satisfy said foreclosure
judgment if one does occur.
14.

That each of the parties shall sign whatever

papers are legally necessary to effectively transfer the
interest that each is to receive in connection with this
agreement and upon failure to do so, the Stipulation and
Property Settlement Agreement shall serve as the full
agreement between the parties and shall serve as an
DECREE OF DIVORCE
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK
Civil No.: 900000252DA
effective and complete transfer of all assets that each
party is to receive under the terms of the Stipulation
and Property Settlement Agreement.
15.

That the Defendant shall assume and discharge

all other attorney fees she owes to her attorney, other
than the amount that the Plaintiff

is contributing

herein.
16.

That Plaintiff shall assume and discharge his

own attorney fees and costs.
NOV

, /

DATED this

y

,

day of October, 1991,

F. L. GUNNELL,
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Decree of Divorce was posted in the
United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed to Don
B.

Southwick,

Plaintiff,

Tremonton, Utah

at

6th

84337 on this

P"

North

100

West,

day of October,

1991.
^

(.rm, I

Secretary

M.

(sm
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October 7, 1991

Mr. Phillip D. Southwick
1050 South 660 West
Tremonton, UT 84337
Re:

Southwick vs. Southwick
My File: 400-V

Comes now the undersigned, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P.
Southwick, beneficiaries under that Trust Agreement dated
September 13, 1989 and which was signed in Tremonton, Utah, and
hereby direct said Trustee to convey and transfer all of the assets
located in said trust to Barbara P. Southwick as the sole
beneficiary under the terms of said Trust Agreement,
That the undersigned, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P.
Southwick, direct the Trustee to do whatever is legally necessary
to remove Don B. Southwick as a beneficiary under the terms of that
Trust Agreement and to designate Barbara P. Southwick as the sole
beneficiary under the terms of the Trust Agreement hereinabove
designated.
That both parties acknowledge they have a copy of the Trust
Agreement and that the direction being made to the Trustee is based
on the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement entered into
by and between Don B. Southwick as Plaintiff and Barbara P.
Southwick as Defendant in a pending divorce action, located in the
First Judicial District Court of Box Elder County, State of Utah,
bearing civil number 900000252DA.
That this letter is signed by both beneficiaries and directed
to the Trustee pursuant to their rights under the Trust Agreement.
DATED this

\\

day of October, 1991.

DON" B. SOUTHWICK,
Plaintiff & Beneficiary

U*X£I»<JJL
3ARA P. SOUTHWICK,
Defendant & Beneficiary

^

TabD

January 24, 1992

Mr. Phillip D. Southwick
1050 South 660 West
Tremonton, UT 84337
Re:

Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. Southwick Trust

Dear Mr. Southwick:
Comes now the undersigned, TRACY L. SOUTHWICK, beneficiary under
that Trust Agreement dated September 13, 1989 which was signed in
Tremonton, Utah, and hereby renounces any claim he may have to
any of the Trust Estate including income and/or principal, all
cash including
bank accounts, and all proceeds from life
insurance policies and further directs said Trustee to distribute
his share of the Trust Estate to PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK.
DATED this 3 (

day of January, 1992.

tf: ^ U T H W I C K
.ciary

Approved and

Accepted by

day of JVU^A_,

the undersigned

as Trustee this

1992.

PHILL^ D. SOUTHWICK
Trustee
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